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The new f~ily economics traces its lineage at least to pioneering work by 
Becker (1973, 1974). Since then, the family tree of family economics has grown 
and branched, most recently to include issues in macroeconomics and economic 
development (Becker, 1988). In addition, the tree's branches have overlapped 
those of disciplines like anthropology which also study the family. 
Ten years ago, Grossbard (1978) proposed marriage between the theory of 
family economics and the large family of empirical material compiled by 
anthropologists. Grossbard derived one set of implications by analyzing 
anthropological material on multiple marriage using family economic theory, 
extending these results in other research (Grossbard, 1976; Grossbard­
Shechtman, 1980). 
As is typical in exploring a new field, a number of issues remain 
unresolved. One issue involves the decision by some cultures to forbid 
multiple ma~riage. In addition, the rich body of data across cultures compiled 
by anthropologists remains largely unexploited. Although the engagement 
between economics and anthropology has lasted ten years, a true marriage is yet 
to be consummated. 
The next section of this paper reviews family economic theory as it applies 
to multiple marriage. Following the theory, the remainder of the paper uses 
the unique cultural data from the Human Relations Area Files to confirm the 
theory's implications. In particular, the data show that cultures which 
restrict polygyny make women worse off but that this action may be justified 
since it favors men who would otherwise not marry in cultures where this method 
of transferring income is relatively efficient. 
I. Multiple Marriage 
Following the new household economics, household members i combine inputs 
of time t and other resources x to produce valuable goods Z. 
i	 i 
(a)	 Z =Z(t , x ) 
i i 
The function is different for each household depending on individual member 
characteristics and the number of members in the household. A man wishes to 
marry a first wife if the man's share of the output within a marriage Z is 
~1 
larger than his output when single Z • 
m 
Similarly, a woman accepts a proposal if her share of the output within a 
marriage is larger than her income when single. Marriage occurs because the 
total value of output in a marriage exceeds the sum of the values of output of 
unmarried individuals. 
In general, marriage is an attractive alternative because men and women 
provide complementary inputs to production of household goods like children and 
companionship. Married couples can also exploit gains from specialization and 
specialized investments in human capital. The production of household public 
goods also favors marriage over single living. 
Aman's decision to propose marrying a second woman is a simple extension 
of that for a monogamous union. The man wishes to marry a second woman if he 
receives any part of the additional output the second wife produces. The woman 
accepts such a proposal if her share of the additional output at least equals 
her alternative income. 
Symmetric analysis applies as well to the situation where a woman considers 
marrying two or more men. Polyandry (multiple husbands) is so rare among 
cultures, however, that it will not be treated explicitly here. 
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Considering the above, each man's demand for a first wife is the marginal 
product of that wife, defined as the difference between his single output and 
the output of the household with one wife. The most he is willing to pay for a 
first wife is-the additional output she produces. 
(b) MP =Z - Z 
mwl mw1 m 
Demand for each subsequent wife (n) is the marginal product of that wife. 
(c)	 MP = Z - Z 
mw(n) mw(n) mw(n-1) 
If men are identical, the market demand for wives is a step function. 
Given the reasonable assumption that the marginal product of wives in a given 
household diminishes, the demand function steps downward. 
More realistically, the market demand slopes continuously downward. Demand 
is continuous because men (and their household production functions) are 
different, because men can vary the quantity of wives by marrying at a 
different age, and because each woman can alter the quantity of services 
offered. 
In the simplest case and if women are identical, the market supply of wives 
is perfectly elastic at price equal to women's alternative income Z and 
f 
perfectly inelastic at the quantity of women of marriageable age. More likely, 
however, the actual supply curve slopes upward continuously. Women have 
different alternative incomes and women can vary their output of wife services 
by changing the age at which they marry, for example. Interaction between 
supply and demand in the market determines the price of wife services and, by 
implication, compensation to each wife. 
Restrictions on this market reduce potential gains from trade. Grossbard 
(1978, p. 35) explains how restrictions on polygamy, for example, distort the 
marriage market: lithe legal imposition of monogamy can be viewed as an 
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interference in the marriage market curtai11ing the aggregate demand men have 
IIfor wife services, Such a restriction makes women and at least some 
men worse off~ 
II. Restrictions~n PolJ~ 
An interesting question is why a society forbids polygamy. Becker (1981, 
p. 39) sidesteps the issue by asserting that such restrictions are Ineaningless: 
"Doctrines encouraging monogamy are attractive only when the demand for 
polygyny is weak; II Becker avoids the question of why some cultures 
outlaw polygyny. After all, if the demand for an activity is weak, why outlaw 
it? The reason proposed in this paper is that a polygyny may impose an 
external cost on certain individuals, an external cost to which the market has 
no incentive to respond without government or social sanction. 
As the simple model shows, women are worse off in a society which would 
otherwise practice polygyny but which forbids it. Who is better off if 
polygyny is forbidden? As both Becker (1981) and Grossbard (1980) show, men 
who otherwise would marry one wife are better off due to the lower cost of all 
wives. However, this gain to men is offset by the income loss to the women in 
these same households. Those men who would otherwise wed multiple wives may be 
better off due to the lower price of the first wife, although this is unlikely 
(Becker 1981, p. 45). Even if true, however, the gain is again offset by the 
loss to the woman in the same household. 
Most dramatically affected by a prohibition on polygyny are men who would 
otherwise not marry. If the sex ratio of marriageable aged individuals is 
roughly equal to one, all of these men now are able to marry. Figure 1 
illustrates the effect of a prohibition on polygyny in a culture that would 











[Figure 1 about here] 
All women are assumed to marry. The area of interest along the supply 
curve is characterized by changes in the quantity of individual wife services 
rather than a change in the number of wives. For simplicity, demanders of 
second and subsequent wives are assumed to be grouped along distance v on the 
demand curve. Because the sex ratio equals one, the v number of demanders of 
multiple wives equals the w men who remain unmarried in an unrestricted market. 
The men who remain unmarried might also represent poor men who must marry 
significantly later in life. That income and age at marriage for Americans are 
inversely related is shown by Becker et al. (1977, p. 1173). 
When polygyny is prohibited, the v demanders are eliminated and the 
remaining tail of the demand curve shifts to the left by distance w. The 
former single men are now married and represent distance w'. Distance Wi is 
actually smaller than distance w by the proportion each woman reduces her 
quantity of services. This small difference is not shown in Figure 1 and does 
not alter its implications. 
The previously unmarried men gain because polygyny is prohibited. Their 
income increases by the difference between the additional output and the 
payments to wives in the households. This area is shaded in Figure 1. As 
drawn, the gain to previously unmarried men is larger than the loss of income 
to their wives. 
Whether the gain to men exceeds the loss to their wives in general depends 
on the elasticity of supply and the slope of the demand curve. Since the 
elasticity of supply reflects in part the degree to which women can alter their 
quantity of wife services, societies with more advanced economies are more 
5
 
likely to prohibit polygyny, other things being equal. In these societies, 
women's production functions are more complex and so women can more 
dramatically alter their output (Grossbard, 1984). 
An additional factor may increase the value of a wife to otherwise 
unmarried men, a factor not reflected in the ordinary demand curve. In 
particular, a wife allows a man to perpetuate his lineage. Of course marriage 
provides the same to women. In this example, however, all women are married 
but some men remain single if polygyny is permitted. 
Especially in primitive societies, a lineage provides social insurance, 
"brand name" capital, and additional intangible benefits (Posner, 1980; Becker, 
1981, p. 240). Importantly, many of these benefits cannot be transferred. In 
addition, a poor man may not be able to accumulate sufficient capital to offer 
to a potential wife the present value of the lineage. Even sophisticated 
capital markets may refuse to offer loans with lineage as collateral, and few 
economies even have sophisticated capital markets. 
If lineage has significant nontransferrable value, the value to otherwise 
unmarried men of a prohibition on polygyny is larger than the shaded area in 
Figure 1. The actual value includes the area under a demand curve above that 
given in the figure reflecting value that cannot be transferred in the market. 
A prohibition on polygyny in a culture where polygyny would otherwise occur 
results in a transfer of wealth to men who would otherwise not marry. It is 
reasonable to suppose that these men are relatively poor. As Grossbard (1976) 
shows, wealth is a very important element in determining the marginal product 
of an additional wife and the probability that a man will have multiple wives. 
Cultures might transfer wealth to the poor for reasons of alturism. In 
addition the non-poor may be willing to allow forced transfers to the poor in 
order to reduce crime rates, disease rates, and potential social disorder. 
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Individuals allow forced transfers because the free rider problem discourages 
voluntary transfers • 
. Why might cultures choose to transfer wealth in this particular manner, 
that is, through a prohibition on polygamy? Ordinarily, we imagine governments 
transferring income to deserving groups. If the government transfers income to 
poor men who would otherwise not marry in polygynous societies, these men now 
are more likely to participate in the marriage market. In addition, these 
government transfers reduce the reliance on lineage to provide social insurance 
and so reduce the problem of poor men being excluded from the marriage market. 
By implication, cultures choose a prohibition on polygyny when central 
governments are relatively weak or unimportant. 
III. Empiric~l Results 
The Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) is a comprehensive source of 
information on human culture. The HRAF provides a detailed index and system of 
cross-referencing seven hundred categories of information from ethnographies 
written by anthropologists about more than three hundred cultures. 
Some of this textual material has been coded by sociologists and 
anthropologists, the first important ex~nple being the Ethnographic A~l~~ 
(Murdock, 1967). Subsequent researchers have coded material for a subset of of 
cultures labelled the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Its cultures are chosen 
dccording to a variety of criteria including that all cultural types be 
represented, that territories not overlap, and that relatively comprehensive 
information be available (Murdock and White, 1969; Lagace, 1977). 
Some of the statistical results are summarized in Table 1, which requires 
explanation. Each column applies to a set of cultures with a certain degree of 
polygyny. The few cultures with polyandry do not appear in this sample. 
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Column (A) cultures prohibit polygyny. Polygyny is permitted but absent in 
column (B) cultures, infrequent in column (C) cultures, and common in column 
(D) cultures. 
Each table row is a cultural characteristic variable. For each variable, 
cultures are placed in a ranked category. See the appendix for a description 
of the variables and their ranked categories. The means of these ranked 
categories are listed in the body of the table. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The table allows us to test implications of the family economic theory 
applied to polygyny and this paper's additional implications. One important 
implication of the Becker-Grossbard model is that a prohibition on polygyny 
reduces the value of a wife. The PRICE variable in the first row of the table 
shows that cultures which prohibit polygyny are significantly more likely to 
use dowry or no bride payment than to employ bridewealth. That is, the 
quantity control on multiple wives reduces the value of a wife, exactly as 
predicted by the theory. 
As the WEALTH variable shows, cultures which prohibit polygyny are also 
significantly poorer than cultures where polygyny is common. The theory also 
predicts this as a result of losses of potential gains from trade. 
The variables MONEY, TRANSPORT, and TRADE measure the complexity of the 
economy. As family economic theory predicts, when the economy becomes more 
complex, polygyny is less likely. Families can substitute quality for quantity 
of children. In addition, women are relatively more productive outside the 
home in more complex economies. 
The above variables likely operate simultaneously to influence a wife's 





TABLE 1--MEAN VALUES OF CULTURAL VARIABLES 
~--~-_._-~ ..... ­
. ~ -_._--.- --- ---- - ----- --- --~.-.- --.- ---~ -- -- ---------------­
FORBID NO POLY SOME POLY COMMON 
PRICE 1.75(abc) 1.20(a) 1.24(b) 1.28 (c) 
WEALTH 5.43(a) 5.70 5.86 7.38(a) 
MONEY 3.00(a) 3.12 2.57 1.91(a} 
TRANSPORT 2.31(a} 2.28 1.85 1.41(a) 
TRADE 3.00(x} 2.27 2.29 1.91(x) 
AGE-DIFF 3.91 3.83 3.82 4.64 
P-LEVELS 1.69(a} 2.78(a) 2.00 1.64 
AD-LEVELS 2.08(a) 3.39(a) 2.34 2.14 
INHERIT 3.11(x) 2.65(x) 2.76 3.05 
a, b, or c after a pair of means indicates that the pair of means in that row 
are significantly different at five percent. x indicates ten percent. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The problt analysis shows that, of the variables available, the most 
important in determining a wife's value is whether the society forbids 
polygyny. This result represents dramatic confirmation of the Becker-Grossbard 
implication, although the potential for mutlicolinearity among independent 
variables remains. 
Another implication of the theory is that women will marry earlier and men 
later in polygynous societies, reflecting the relatively high value of women. 
This in turn implies a greater age difference at first marriage for polygynous 
societies. Values of the HRAF variable AGE-DIFF are consistent with this 
result, although the differences between culture types are not statistically 
significant. 
Several important implications of the standard family economic theory are 
confirmed using the HRAF data. However, the standard theory fails to address 
the question- of why societies choose to forbid polygamy. The standard theory 
in fact predicts that societies that forbid polygamy should be very similar to 
those in which polygamy is permitted but absent. In the variables discussed to 
this point, the implication is generally true, with the exception of PRICE 
which is significantly different for societies which forbid polyg~ny. 
Differing from the standard theory, this paper hypothesizes that cultures 
forbid polygyny to transfer income to poor men. The variables P-LEVELS and AD­
LEVELS measure the complexity of the culture's government. Notice that 
cultures which forbid polygyny possess significantly less complex governments 
than cultures which permit but do not practice polygyny. This result directly 





TABLE 2--PROBIT ANALYSIS OF VALUE OF A WIFE 
dependent CONSTANT FORBID WEALTH TRADE fraction 
variable explained 
---------------------------_._-­
PRICE 2.07 1.37 0.57 
(4.00)** (3.21)** 
4.48 2.04 0.29 -0.02 0.61 
(2.51)* (2.63)** (1.61) (-0.09) 
Numbers in parentheses are the ratios of the coefficient and its asymptotic
standard error, distributed normally for large samples. Small sample
characteristics are unknown. 
* indicates asymptotically significant at five percent, two-tailed. 
** indicates asymptotically significant at one percent, two-tailed. 
One additional result also (weakly) supports the income transfer 
hypothesis. The variable INHERIT indicates that women are more likely to 
inherit valuable property in cultures which forbid polygyny and in cultures 
where polygyny is common than in cultures where polygyny is uncommon or is 
absent. Apparently the quantity control on wives is not completely effective 
at reducing the otherwise substantial value of a wife. Once again, cultures 
which forbid polygyny are significantly different from those where polygyny is 
permitted but not practiced. 
Table 3 shows results of probit and multinomial probit analyses of 
cultures which prohibit and which permit polygyny. The variable Q-POLY 
combines the three sets of cultures which permit polygyny and ranks them in 
ascending order, cultures with common polygyny having the highest rank. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Once again cultures which prohibit polygyny are different than those in 
which polygyny is permitted but does not occur. The P-LEVELS and AD-LEVELS 
variables in Table 31 s first set of probit equations indicate that an increase 
in the complexity of government either has insignificant effect or reduces the 
frequency of polygyny (Q-POLY) in the culture. Complex governments tend to 
provide the social insurance otherwise provided by complex families and the two 
government variables may be serving as proxy for overall wealth and complexity 
of the economy. 
By contrast, the P-LEVELS and Q-LEVELS variables in the second set of 
probit equations show that cultures with complex governments are much less 
likely to forbid polygyny. In other words, cultures with simple governments 




TABLE 3--PROBIT ANALYSIS OF POLYGYNY
 
-------------- ---- ---------_.~ --- --- --- -. -- -... - ------- ---­--~ 
------------------- ---- -~-- -~ --- ---- -~ .. -- ----- ---~------ --­
dependent CONSTANT P-LEVELS AD-LEVELS WEALTH TRADE fraction 
variable explained 
----- - -- . . - . -- .-- . . . -- - . --- - -----. -- -- --- ­~ 
Q-POLY -1.83 -0.60 0.39 0.60 
(-2.20)* (-2.40)* (1.51) 
-1.35 -0.49 0.25 0.58 
(-2.07)* (-2.17)* (1.12) 
-0.86 -0.49 0.13 0.28 0.56 
(-0.55) (-1.45) (0.62) (1.05 ) 
-0.33 -0.47 0.17 0.23 0.56 
(-0.24) (-1.53) (0.80) (0.94) 
FORBID 0.94 -0.34 0.39 0.67 
(1.95 ) (-2.58)** (2.36)* 
0.91 -0.39 0.36 0.66 
(1.87) (-2.20)* (2.18)* 
-1.27 -0.65 -0.32 0.52 0.74 
(-0.94) (-2.62)** (-1.52) (1.89) 
-1.64 -1.11 -0.35 0.57 0.76 
(-1.14) (-2.41)* (-1.46) (1.90) 
Numbers in parentheses are the ratios of the coefficient and its asymptotic
standard error, distributed normally for large samples. Small sample 
characteristics are unknown. 
* indicates asymptotically significant at five percent, two-tailed. 
** indicates asymptotically significant at one percent, two-tailed. 
likely to have extensive polygyny if they permit polygyny. Thus, the 
prohibition on polygyny occurs in cultures that are otherwise similar to those 
that have extensive polygyny. The prohibition is altering behavior, rather 
than simply reflecting existing practice, as the standard theory predicts. 
The hypothesis here is that cultures with simple governments prohibit 
polygyny to transfer wealth to men who otherwise would not marry. Notice in 
Table 3 that the WEALTH variable is negative, albeit only weakly significant, 
in the second set of equations. Poorer cultures are more likely to prohibit 
polygyny. This result is consistent with the theory especially if poor 
cultures also have greater variation in wealth. 
IV. Caveats 
Although the statistical results lend an encouraging degree of support to 
family economic theory and its extension here, several caveats are in order. 
First, in compiling the data, coders read text about a culture and assign a 
number according to some prearranged scheme. Such a process is obviously 
subjective. Some researchers address this problem by employing multiple 
coders, Ellis, Lee, and Petersen (1978) being an example. 
Second, aside from the relatively small fraction of culture in the sample 
for which complete data are available, the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample is 
not a random sample. As mentioned, cultures are chosen based on other 
criteria. This is a serious problem if the sample is biased in some way. For 
example, because of the emphasis of anthropological research, modern western 
industrial cultures may be underrepresented. 
These problems ought not prevent economics researchers from exploiting the 
Human Relations Area Files. We claim our theories apply universally but 
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typically restrict our empirical investigation to modern industrial societies. 
Research like this represents an attempt to redress the imbalance. 
v. Summarl 
Family economic theory is an important extension of economic theory. This 
paper uses data from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of the Human Relations 
Area Files to test implications of family economic theory related to multiple 
marriage. As the theory predicts, actions which interfere with the marriage 
market make most participants worse off. In particular, in those cultures 
which forbid polygyny, the value of a wife falls. Polygyny disappears in more 
complex economies, economies in which the value of the quantity of children is 
relatively less important than the quality of children. 
Importantly, cultures which forbid polygyny are different from those which 
permit but do not practice polygyny. A prohibition on polygyny transfers 
income to poor men who would otherwise not marry. The value of this 
restriction .is greater when lineage is valuable but not transferable. Cultures 
without complex central governments are more likely to prohibit polygyny. 
Central governments would otherwise transfer income to deserving groups. 
This paper is an attempt to continue the engagement between economics and 
anthropology. If the marriage between economics and anthropology is to 
succeed, economists must exploit the vast store of data compiled in the Human 
Relations Area Files. This paper is a first attempt to do so. 
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Appendix: VARIABLES USED IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 






----------------_.­ - -­ - ---- --­








These 18 cultures permit polygyny, but no polygyny occurs. 
These 32 cultures permit polygyny and roughly twenty 
percent or fewer marriages dfe polygynous. 
COMMON (4) na These 22 cultures permit polygyny and more than 
twenty percent of marriages are polygynous. 
roughly 
PRICE (1) 1-2 One indicates significant bridewealth 
indicates no payment or dowry. 
is used. Two 
WEALTH (2) 2-10 Overall 
living. 
standard of living. Ten indicates high standard of 
MONEY (3) 1-5 Complexity of currency in the economy. Five indicates 
fully developed and specialized currency. 
a 
TRANSPORT (3) 1-5 Complexity of land transportation. One indicates human 
carriers. Five indicates motorized vehicles. 
TRADE (3) 1-5 Complexity of methods of trading imported food. 
indicates shops, markets, and barter are used. 
Five 
AGE-DIFF (4) 1-5 Relative ages of spouses at marriage. One indicates 
older. Five indicates men more than 4 years older. 
women 
P-LEVELS (5) 1-4 Levels of political sovereignty above the local 
indicates none. Four indicates three levels. 
level. One 
AD-LEVELS (5) 1-5 Complexity of administrative hierarchy. One indicates 
hierarchy. Five indicates territorial administrators 
supervised by supreme state executive. 
no 
INHERIT (4) 1-4 Which sex inherits valuable property? 
four women. 
One indicates men, 
--~-~~ .....~-~~ ..._--------~----------
(1) Murdock, 1967. (4) Whyte, 1978. 
(2) Ellis, Lee, and Petersen, 1978. (5) Tuden and Marshall, 1972. 
(3) Murdock and Morrow, 1970. 
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